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AGENCY POWERS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES UNDER
THE ALABAMA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT:




Alabama's Limited Liability Company Act (Alabama LLC
Act)' brought Alabama into the age of new business forms.
From 1988 to the present, the limited liability company (LLC), a
hybrid business organization combining partnership and corpo-
ration characteristics, swept the country in leaps and bounds.2
* BA., Auburn University, 1993; J.D., University of Alabama, 1996; and
associated with the law firm of Copeland, Franco, Screws & Gill, PA., Montgomery,
Alabama. This Article grew out of an independent study project Mr. Boles completed
for Professor Hamill during his third year of law school.
** Associate Professor of Law, The University of Alabama. Professor Hamill
thanks Dean Kenneth C. Randall and her faculty colleagues for all their support and
gratefully acknowledges Bob Keatinge for his valuable comments and the support of
the University of Alabama Law School Foundation, the Edward Brett Randolph
Fund, and the William H. Sadler Fund. Professor Hamill also specially recognizes
the students in Alabama's class of 1996 who completed the first course offered at
Alabama focusing on LLCs and LLPs. Their valuable classroom participation contrib-
uted greatly toward the understanding of the issues discussed in this Article as well
as other important issues in this area.
1. Alabama Limited Liability Company Act, ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to -61 (1994)
[hereinafter Alabama LLC Act].
2. In 1988, when the IRS recognized the LLC's right to be a partnership, only
Wyoming and Florida had LLC statutes on their books. By the close of 1996, all
fifty states and the District of Columbia recognized the right to do business as an
LLC. For a complete discussion of LLC legislation through 1994, see Susan Pace
Hamill, The Taxation of Domestic Limited Liability Companies and Limited Partner-
ships: A Case For Eliminating the Partnership Classification Regulations, 73 WASH.
U. L.Q. 565, 566 n.4 (1995).
In 1991, a related business entity, the limited liability partnership (LLP)
began percolating through the states. LLPs were created to provide partners with
liability protection from the negligence committed by their fellow partners, normally
in a professional malpractice setting. The level of liability protection provided by
LLPs varies somewhat from state to state and is defined explicitly in the relevant
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The LLC represents the first nationally accepted domestic entity
offering partnership business characteristics and tax classifica-
tion with the hallmark corporate trait of limited liability protec-
tion for all owners.' In 1993, the year when 18 states, 4 more
states than any other year, passed LLC legislation, Alabama
adopted the Alabama LLC Act.' In August 1995, the National
statute. In all other business respects, LLPs, unlike LLCs, are general partnerships.
For an excellent discussion of the consequences of the varying degrees of liability
protection offered by LLPs, see Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability
Partnerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 1065 (1995). For an
exhaustive discussion of LLPs in general, see Robert R. Keatinge et al., Limited
Liability Partnerships: The Next Step in the Evolution of the Unincorporated Business
Organization, 51 Bus. LAW. 147 (1995); Jennifer J. Johnson, Limited Liability for
Lawyers: General Partners Need Not Apply, 51 Bus. LAw. 85 (1995).
3. For an early discussion of LLCs, focusing primarily on their tax classifica-
tion, see Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Possible Choice For
Doing Business?, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 721 (1989). For an overall discussion of the
business and tax issues confronting LLCs, see Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Lim-
ited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375 (1992).
For a general discussion of LLCs from a business perspective with an emphasis on
fiduciary duty problems, see Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Preludes: Likely Issues
for LLCs, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 1043 (1995); Claire Moore Dickerson, Equilibrium
Destabilized: Fiduciary Duties Under the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 25
STETSON L. REV. 417 (1995); Steven C. Bahls, Application of Corporate Common Law
Doctrines to Limited Liability Companies, 55 MONT. L. REV. 43 (1994); Sandra K.
Miller, What Standards of Conduct Should Apply to Members and Managers of
Limited Liability Companies?, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 21 (1994); S. Mark Curwin,
Fiduciary Duty and the Minnesota Limited Liability Company: Sufficient Protection of
Member Interests?, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 989 (1993). For an excellent discussion
of fiduciary obligations toward an LLC in the context of attorneys representing
LLCs, see Robert R. Keatinge, The Implications of Fiduciary Relationships in Repre-
senting Limited Liability Companies and Other Unincorporated Associations and
Their Partners or Members, 25 STETSON L. REV. 389 (1995).
For exhaustive treatises covering all legal problems confronting LLCs with ex-
tensive statutory summary lists and sample operating agreements, see 1-4 LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATiNGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES (1992 & Supp. 1996); CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIM-
ITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW (1994 & Supp. 1996).
4. See Hamill, supra note 2, at 566 n.4.
5. On April 22, 1993, the Senate passed the Alabama LLC Act. See S. 549,
1993 Reg. Sess., 1993 S.J. Ala. 1293-94. On May 17, 1993, the House of Representa-
tives passed the Act. See S. 549, 1993 Reg. Sess., 1993 H.J. Ala. 4141-42. On that
same day, the Act was signed by both houses. See 1993 S.J. Ala. 2845-46; 1993 H.J.
Ala. 4165-66. Governor Jim Folsom signed the Alabama LLC Act on May 20, 1993,
with an effective date of October 1, 1993. See 1993 Ala. Acts 1425. For an excellent
discussion of all the provisions in the Alabama LLC Act, see Bradley J. Sklar & W.
Todd Carlisle, The Alabama Limited Liability Company Act, 45 ALA. L. REV. 145
(1993).
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Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved
the final version of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
(the Uniform LLC Act).' Prompted by the experience reflected in
the Uniform LLC Act and its commentary, at some point in the
future, Alabama, like most other states, should carefully exam-
ine its current statute and consider refining certain provisions
and the commentary.
At the time of its enactment, the Alabama LLC Act reflected
a state of the art, mainstream statute. Like most state LLC
statutes enacted before completion of the Uniform LLC Act, the
Alabama LLC Act does not expressly address the fiduciary du-
ties owed by members and managers.7 The Alabama LLC Act's
governance and agency provisions, like virtually all other state
LLC statutes, creates two regimes hinging on whether or not the
LLC appoints managers.8 If the LLC appoints no managers, the
Alabama LLC Act grants each member broad apparent authority
to bind the LLC; however, if the LLC appoints managers, only
the managers statutorily possess broad apparent authority and
members as such have no statutorily granted apparent authori-
ty.9 The Alabama LLC Act allows members to use the operating
agreement to either create authority to bind the LLC where
none exists under the statute or remove authority otherwise
contemplated by the statute."
Rather than attempting to comment on all aspects of the
Alabama LLC Act which the Alabama Legislature may consider
refining, this Article confronts two main issues. The Article
points out certain problems when defining the scope of the
members' and managers' power to bind the LLC and discusses
6. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. AcT (1995) [hereinafter ULLCA]. Because the IRS
intends to allow all domestic unincorporated businesses to choose partnership tax
status without regard to the four-factor partnership classification test, see Prop.
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -361, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989 (1996), the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is in the process of revising the
Uniform LLC Act. The provisions dealing with management and fiduciary duties are
not expected to be affected by this revision. See Carter G. Bishop, The Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act: Summary & Analysis, 51 Bus. LAW. 51 (1995), and
Larry E. Ribstein, A Critique of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 25
STETSON L. REV. 311 (1995), for a general discussion of the Uniform LLC Act.
7. See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 3, § 9.01.
8. See ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-21 to -22 (1994).
9. See id.
10. See id. § 10-12-24 (1994).
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the necessity of codifying the boundaries of fiduciary duty
protections in the statute and the commentary. Section II first
notes that the legislature need only make conforming revisions
to the Alabama LLC Act's provisions addressing the power to
manage and bind the LLC to reflect changes made to Alabama's
general partnership law after the legislature adopted the Re-
vised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA)." Section II then ex-
plores the difficulty in ascertaining the scope of a member's
apparent authority if that member acquires actual authority in
the operating agreement to bind the LLC even though managers
have been appointed. The Alabama Legislature should provide
guidance in the commentary determining the scope of such
member's apparent authority. The primary factors identified in
the commentary should include the extent of the actual authori-
ty granted by the operating agreement, as well as the LLC's
relative size and the degree of centralized management it main-
tains on a practical level. 2
Section III discusses the internal protection LLC members
should receive under the revised Alabama statute through fidu-
ciary duties owed by the members of member-managed LLCs
and the managers of manager-managed LLCs. The appropriate
level of fiduciary duty protection, which looks at the level of
trust, dependency, and power relationships between the parties,
cannot be properly defined without ascertaining the members'
and managers' legal and actual rights the members and manag-
ers have to bind and participate in the control of the LLC. Stat-
ed differently, the level of authority to bind the LLC created by
both the statute and the operating agreement is highly related
to the proper degree of fiduciary duties imposed by the stat-
ute." If the members choose not to appoint managers, thus re-
taining their statutorily granted power to bind the LLC, the
Alabama LLC Act should statutorily impose on all members the
same general fiduciary duties general partners owe each oth-
er. 4 If the LLC appoints managers, only the manager should
statutorily owe significant fiduciary duties reflecting the same
11. See Alabama Uniform Partnership Act (1996), ALA. CODE §§ 10-8A-101 to
-1109 (Supp. 1996) (effective Jan. 1, 1997) [hereinafter Ala. RUPA].
12. See infra notes 19-70 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
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standard applied to general partners and members of a member-
managed LLC. 5 These statutory fiduciary duties will work best
in manager-managed LLCs where the operating agreement cre-
ates no authority and management powers for the members and
takes no power away from the managers.
However, once the operating agreement starts vesting man-
agement powers in nonmanaging members or divesting powers
away from managers, it becomes impossible to statutorily define
the scope of fiduciary duties owed by both the nonmanaging
members and the managers. 6 To address these situations, the
Alabama Legislature should provide extensive commentary out-
lining the possible boundaries on fiduciary duties owed by the
nonmanaging members and managers when the operating agree-
ment alters the basic statutory management structure which
vests no powers to the members but all powers to the manag-
ers.' The vast flexibility allowed in the operating agreement
prevents the commentary from providing precise guidance to all
LLCs. The commentary should therefore generally state that
nonmanaging members acquiring rights to participate in the
business of closely-held LLCs more easily owe full fiduciary
duties covering the entire business than comparable
nonmanaging members of widely-held LLCs operating as a cen-
tralized management unit. The commentary should also address
the fiduciary duties owed by managers who do not possess full
powers to manage and bind the LLC under the operating agree-
ment. Before releasing these managers from the full fiduciary
duties imposed by the statute, the facts and circumstances
should strongly indicate that the members do not depend on
them to oversee the entire business. 8
15. See infra notes 94-119 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 106-119 and accompanying text.
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II. THE POWER TO BIND THE LLC
A Member-Managed LLCs
Originating from agency and partnership law,19 the Ala-
bama LLC Act and the Uniform LLC Act confer management
rights to all members" and deem every member an agent of
the LLC, cloaking them, by virtue of their member status alone,
with agency power to bind the LLC for transactions "apparently
carrying on in the usual way the business or affairs of the limit-
ed liability company."2' Consequently, third parties dealing
with members of member-managed LLCs can generally assume
that these members have authority to bind the LLC as long as
the member is acting within the scope of the LLC's usual busi-
ness.' These LLC members have apparent authority extending
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 8A (1959). For ex-
tensive coverage of all aspects of partnership law, see 1-4 ALAN R. BROMBERG &
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP (1996), and J. WIL-
LIAM CALLISON, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE (1992). See also BISHOP &
KLEINBERGER, supra note 3, §§ 7.01-.08.
20. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-22 (1994); ULLCA § 404 (1995). All members have
the right to participate in the business decisions concerning the LLC, and the
commentary indicates that the members vote per capita unless they agree to a
different voting formula. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-22 commentary (1994); ULLCA
§ 404 cmt. (1995). The Alabama LLC Act does not indicate which business decisions
require unanimous approval, and which require only majority approval. By setting
out an exclusive list of matters requiring unanimous approval, the Uniform LLC Act
implicitly requires the members to define in the operating agreement business
decisions not on this list but nevertheless important enough to warrant a unanimous
vote; otherwise, a majority carries the decision. See ULLCA § 404(c) (1995). Howev-
er, the partnership statutes state that ordinary decisions need only majority approval
while extraordinary decisions require unanimity, leaving it up to the courts to draw
the line between the two. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(h) (1914) [hereinafter
UPA]; REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 401(j) (1994) [hereinafter RUPA]; Ala.
RUPA, ALA. CODE § 10-8A-401(j) (Supp. 1996). Although the management portion of
this Article focuses on the power to bind rather than voting standards, when the
Alabama Legislature revises the Alabama LLC Act, they should add conforming
language which reflects the Alabama RUPA position regarding voting standards for
ordinary and extraordinary business decisions. See infra notes 30-32 and accompany-
ing text.
21. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-21(a); ULLCA § 301(a).
22. Because members of member-managed LLCs, like partners in general part-
nerships, presumably act as co-owners actively participating in the business, public
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to the borders of the LLC's usual business even if the LLC mem-
ber acts beyond the scope of his or her actual authority, because,
for example, the operating agreement restricts that member's
actual authority.' By treating all members of a member-man-
aged LLC as general agents to carry on the LLC's usual busi-
ness, the statute assumes that for this purpose LLC members
are tantamount to general partners.'
As noted, the members of a member-managed LLC may use
the operating agreement to restrict the scope of a particular
member's actual authority to bind the LLC. Although this agree-
ment will be fully enforceable among the members internally,
within the boundaries of contract law, third parties without
knowledge of the restriction are entitled to rely on the particular
member's apparent authority as long as that member acted
within the scope of the LLC's usual business.' Borrowing from
language of UPA, the Alabama LLC Act only extinguishes the
third party's right to rely on the member's apparent authority
when the third party "has knowledge of the fact that the mem-
ber has no such authority."' Over the years the case law has
policy supports protecting third parties by broadly defining each partner or member's
apparent authority to cover all aspects of the partnership's or LLC's business. See 1
BROMBERG & RIBSTEiN, supra note 19, § 4.01(b).
23. See ULLCA § 301 cmt.; see also 1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 19,
§ 4.02(c); 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 3, §§ 8.08-.09.
24. The statutory language of the Alabama LLC Act addressing the power of
members to bind the LLC essentially follows the language of the Uniform Part-
nership Act (UPA). See UPA § 9(1). The comparable language of the Uniform LLC
Act tracts the language of RUPA. See RUPA § 301 cmt. 2. Although RUPA made
minor language changes to § 9(1) of UPA, the drafters intended no substantive
change altering years of precedent defining the scope of partnership's business. See
RUPA § 301 cmt. 2. Because Alabama has now adopted RUPA, when the Alabama
Legislature revises the Alabama LLC Act, it should change the language of ALA.
CODE § 10-12-21 to reflect RUPA rather than UPA.
25. Alabama operating agreements must be in writing and unless the initial
written agreement authorizes oral amendments, all amendments must be in writing.
See ALA. CODE § 10-12-24 (1994). Although strong arguments can be made to the
contrary, it seems that the requirement of a writing unduly hampers small, informal
LLCs. Moreover the law of contracts contains enough precedent to deal with oral
agreements. See ULLCA § 103(a) cmt.; see also ADVISOR'S REPORT ON THE UNIFORM
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AcT 15-16 (1995) (supporting oral operating agreements
generally but stating matters addressing contribution, dissolution, and new members
should require a writing).
26. ALA. CODE § 10-12-21(a) (1994). The Alabama Legislature took this language
verbatim from the comparable provision in UPA. See UPA § 9(1).
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interpreted "actual knowledge" as requiring a cognitive aware-
ness of the restriction imposed on the member's or the partner's
authority." Borrowing from RUPA, the Uniform LLC Act, in
addition to making minor changes to UPA's standard focusing
on notice, provides an elaborate "notification procedure" where a
third party can be deemed to have constructive knowledge of a
restriction on a member's authority.' With the exception of
restrictions governing which members have the authority to
transfer the LLC's real property, the notification procedure re-
quires much more than a mere filing in a central, public loca-
tion.' The notification procedure provides an avenue, unavail-
able under UPA or the current Alabama LLC Act, to cut off
apparent authority.
The Alabama LLC Act properly treats members of a mem-
ber-managed LLC as general partners when defining their
rights to manage and the scope of their power to bind the
LLC. 0 Although the law governing LLC members and general
partners clearly contains one glaring difference, the limited
liability enjoyed by LLC members compared with the personal
liability exposure of general partners,"' no valid policy reason
exists to treat the two groups differently when defining their
scope of apparent authority to bind the partnership or LLC.
While personal liability of the owners may increase the assets
available to satisfy the obligations of the organization, questions
of apparent authority focus on the initial determination of
whether a particular action of an owner or agent gives rise to an
obligation of the organization. 2
Consequently, the default provisions and the commentary
27. See 1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 19, § 4.02(c); see also ULLCA
§ 102 cmt.
28. See ULLCA § 102; RUPA § 102.
29. In order to effectively extinguish a member's or a partner's apparent au-
thority by providing notification of a restriction on actual authority, the LLC mem-
bers or partners must either make the third party aware of the restriction or duly
deliver the notification document to the third party's place of business. See ULLCA
§ 102. Although the notification procedure obviously offers third parties greater
protection than central filings, it nevertheless requires the third party to possess a
lesser degree of awareness than the knowledge standard under UPA. See ULLCA
§ 102 cmt.
30. See ALA. CODE §§ 10-8-49(a), -12-21, -12-22 (1994).
31. See ALA CODE §§ 10-8-52, -12-20.
32. See 1 JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 8.2 (1995).
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governing the power to bind the LLC should continue to mirror
the comparable provisions under Alabama's general partnership
law.' The Alabama Legislature should conform the language
defining the scope of apparent authority to reflect Alabama's
RUPA and adopt RUPA's standard of third party notice with a
notification procedure allowing Alabama LLC members the same
ability as general partners to cut off a particular member's ap-
parent authority. The broad apparent authority of all members
to bind the LLC, combined with the ability to destroy that au-
thority through the notification procedure, balances the needs of
third parties and LLC members. Moreover, the precedent appli-
cable to partners and partnerships will be available to help LLC
members and third parties dealing with LLCs ascertain the
boundaries of a particular member's authority.'
B. Manager-Managed LLCs
If the LLC's articles of organization designate managers,
then only the managers have the power to manage and make
business decisions on behalf of the LLC' and only the man-
agers enjoy agency power to bind the LLC for transactions "car-
rying on in the usual way the business affairs of the LLC." s
Third parties dealing with the LLC can only rely on the appar-
ent authority of a manager acting within the scope of the LLC's
usual business. 7 The LLC's managers can be likened to general
partners of limited partnerships' or the combined roles of cor-
33. Because Alabama is now a RUPA jurisdiction, the revised Alabama LLC
Act's provisions dealing with management and power to bind should reflect the lan-
guage of the Alabama RUPA for consistency purposes. See supra note 24 and ac-
companying text.
34. See ULLCA § 104(a) & cmt.
35. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-22(b) (1994); ULLCA § 404(b).
36. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-21(bX2). The language in the Uniform LLC Act
addressing the manager's apparent authority to bind the LLC uses the technical
language of RUPA. See ULLCA § 301(b).
37. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-21(c); cf. supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text
(pertaining to reliance by third parties on apparent authority of members acting
within the scope of the business of the member-managed LLC).
38. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 403(a) (1985) [hereinafter
RULPA]. Only the general partners in a limited partnership possess the ability to
manage and control and the agency power to bind the partnership. See also 4
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 19, § 14.01(b).
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porate directors and officers. 9 On the other hand, the LLC's
members, enjoying no statutorily sanctioned powers to manage
and make business decisions on behalf of the LLC or bind the
LLC in transactions with third parties, share similar traits with
limited partners' and corporate shareholders.4' Using the op-
erating agreement, the members and managers enjoy virtually
unlimited flexibility42 to restrict the degree of actual authority
possessed by managers,' to bind the LLC, or to grant certain
members actual authority to bind the LLC in designated trans-
actions.'
In a manager-managed LLC, if the operating agreement
does not alter the statutory management and agency provisions,
the third parties should only be able to rely on a manager's
apparent authority to bind the LLC. Unlike a general partner
39. See ALA. CODE §§ 10-2B-8.01, .41 (1994) (setting out general duties of
directors and officers). Directors as a group are responsible for making the major
policy decisions concerning the corporation, but individually possess no agency
powers to bind the corporation. See 1 Cox, supra note 32, § 8.4. Officers are high-
level corporate employees appointed by the directors and individually derive agency
authority to bind the corporation from their status as employees. See id. §§ 8.4, .13;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY §§ 220, 228 (1957).
40. See RULPA § 303(a). Like LLC members, limited partners in the limited
partnership have no statutorily sanctioned powers to bind the limited partnership or
make business decisions concerning the limited partnership. See generally 4
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 19, § 14.01(c) (setting forth the powers of limited
partners to act as agents).
41. See ALA. CODE §§ 10-2B-7.01 to .32 (1994) (detailing provisions setting out
shareholders rights containing no express agency powers); 2 COX, supra note 32,
§§ 13.1, .3 (shareholders' statutory powers limited to voting rights, rights to sue, and
rights to information).
42. Persons using the corporate form possess vast flexibility to enhance rights of
shareholders to manage and bind the corporation through shareholder agreements.
See ALA. CODE § 10-2B-7.32. However, persons using limited partnerships, do not
enjoy the same degree of flexibility to allow limited partners rights to manage and
bind the limited partnership because the statute treats limited partners whose
activities rise to the level of controlling the business as general partners with full
personal liability exposure. See RULPA § 303(b). See generally 4 BROMBERG &
RIBSTEIN, supra note 19, § 14.01(b).
43. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The operating agreement can also
restrict the managers or enhance the members' power to participate in the internal
business decisions of the LLC. For example, they can alter the statutory defaults
concerning per capita voting or expand or restrict the types of decisions requiring
unanimity. The members' agreement also can partially or wholly take away the
manager's power to make certain business decisions. See supra note 20 and accom-
panying text.
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who gave up the statutorily conferred authority to bind the part-
nership, members of an LLC with managers never statutorily
possessed the power to bind the LLC in the scope of its busi-
ness." Consequently, absent evidence that the operating agree-
ment grants a nonmanaging member the power to bind the
LLC," it would be unreasonable to hold the LLC responsible
for truly unauthorized acts of a member by creating apparent
authority using a theory that would have to disregard the core
purpose of a manager-managed LLC-the ability to centralize
management by separating ownership and control of the LLC.
Consequently, the Alabama Legislature need not alter the basic
statutory structure addressing the power to bind the LLC for
manager-managed LLCs that maintain complete separation of
ownership and control in a highly centralized managed struc-
ture.
The members of a LLC can use the operating agreement to
restrict the scope of a manager's actual authority to bind the
LLC.47 The restrictions can be of limited scope' or cover more
extensive aspects of the LLC's business.49 The operating agree-
ment can even relegate the manager to a mere ministerial agent
with duties confined to keeping the LLC's books and filing the
necessary tax returns and other elections.' Regardless of the
45. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-21(bX2) (1994); ULLCA § 301(bXl) (1995).
46. In a manager-managed LLC, under bath the Uniform and the Alabama LLC
Acts, the statute removes nonmanaging members' apparent authority; the existence
of actual authority remains a question of fact. Serious injustices to third parties can
result due to Alabama's requirement that the operating agreement be in writing.
Although the written operating agreement confers no authority for a nonmanaging
member to bind the LLC, members can, by course of conduct which is acquiesced to
by others, hold themselves out as having the power to bind. Third party creditors,
understandably through observing the conduct, will assume the member has actual
authority to bind the LLC. Because Alabama requires a written operating agreement,
the LLC can attempt to deny the existence of that authority by arguing that the
agreement, in failing to meet the writing requirement, never granted the authority.
If Alabama allows oral operating agreements, that course of conduct would be
considered a grant of actual authority, entitling the third party to enforce the
transaction against the LLC. See supra note 25.
47. See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 3, § 8.08.
48. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
50. Depending on the degree of the manager's absence from the LLC's day-to-
day business and transactions involving the LLC, third parties may more easily
obtain knowledge or notice of the restrictions.
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limited or extensive nature of the manager's role, third parties
without knowledge or notification should be entitled to assume
that a manager has the authority to bind the LLC within the
scope of its business.5' The manager, identified as such in the
articles, plays a role indistinguishable from members in a mem-
ber-managed LLC or general partners; therefore, the internal
operating agreement alone should not be capable of destroying
the apparent authority created by the statute.52 Consequently,
the Alabama Legislature need not alter the basic statutory
structure addressing the apparent authority of managers even if
the internal operating agreement removes part or most of the
manager's rights to control and bind the LLC.
As already noted, the operating agreement of manager-man-
aged LLCs can vest actual authority in members, not designated
as managers, to engage in transactions with third parties.3
Nonmanaging members can also acquire actual authority to bind
the LLC by becoming agents, employees or independent contrac-
tors. The scope of the actual authority will depend on the terms
of the agency, employment or contractual relationship.' 4 Be-
cause the statute never granted full apparent authority to
nonmanaging members, third parties cannot automatically as-
sume that this member possesses authority to bind the LLC in
all aspects of its business.55
Like most LLC statutes, the Alabama statute and commen-
tary provide no guidance on the scope of the nonmanaging
member's apparent authority." Existing agency law, however,
determines the scope of this member's apparent authority. De-
51. See ULLCA § 102 cmt. (1995).
52. As a practical matter, in the limited partnership context, the need to inter-
pret the scope of the general partner's apparent authority will not come up. Limited
partnerships possess no ability to extensively restrict the general partner's authority
because these restrictions may require limited partners to assume more authority
than the statute will tolerate, while allowing them to retain limited liability protec-
tion. See supra note 42.
53. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
54. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-24 (1994); ULLCA § 103 cmt.
55. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-21(b); ULLCA § 301(b).
56. See generally 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 3, § 8.09 (noting the
ambiguity as to a member's authority under LLC statutes, in that "a member does
not have any agency power as such, although a member may be empowered to act
for the firm").
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pending on the facts and circumstances, 7 the member will ei-
ther be treated as a general agent or a special agent of the
LLC.' The actual authority of a special agent, involving a sin-
gle transaction or a series of transactions not involving a conti-
nuity of service, will carry with it a more limited veil of appar-
ent authority protecting third parties.59 On the other hand,
general agents, receiving actual authority to conduct a series of
transactions involving a continuity of service, obtain consider-
ably broad apparent authority, which provides greater protection
for third parties."° Members of member-managed LLCs, manag-
ers of manager-managed LLCs, and general partners of partner-
ships are all general agents of their respective businesses with
apparent authority to bind covering the extent of the entity's
usual or ordinary business.81
Numerous facts and circumstances developed over time in
agency law can clearly be tailored to the LLC situation and used
to help distinguish which members that receive actual authority
solely from the operating agreement should be deemed general
agents versus special agents of the LLC. These factors, which
look to the degree of the actual authority granted to the mem-
ber, include the relationship between the member and the LLC
entity, the extent of the member's service to the LLC, the num-
ber of acts performed by the member, the number of people the
member must deal with, and the length of time the member
needs to accomplish the act. 2 In addition to these factors, the
practical manner in which the particular LLC operates, as a
centralized or decentralized unit, should also independently help
determine whether or not the member is deemed a special or
general agent."c Simple hypotheticals illustrate how the extent
57. See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 3 (1958) (defining general and
special agent).
59. See id. § 161(A) (stating a special agent can only bind the principal pursu-
ant to the limited circumstances prescribed by the principal).
60. See id. § 161 cmt. a.
61. See id. § 3 cmt. a (stating "continuity of service rather than the extent of
discretion or responsibility is the hallmark of a general agent"). Because general
partners, LLC members (of member-managed LLCs) and LLC managers (of manager-
managed LLCs) are statutorily presumed to serve the entity continuously by virtue
of their powers to manage and control, they meet this definition of general agent.
62. See id.
63. The law addressing a limited partner's special or general agent status will
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of the actual authority granted to the nonmanaging member can
work together with the degree of the LLC's centralization of
management to distinguish between special and general agents.
The first hypothetical presents a closely-held, manager-man-
aged LLC operating as a decentralized unit where a
nonmanaging member receives significant actual authority.
The members of Mom and Pop's Grocery LLC properly ap-
point members X & Y as the LLC's managers. The LLC, consist-
ing of five members, unanimously grants member Q actual au-
thority under the written operating agreement to purchase meat
from the local butcher, fish from an independent fishery market
and paper products, cleaning products, and refrigeration supplies
from the local distributor. Over time, while observing the transac-
tions between Q and these third parties, local fruit supplier con-
cludes Q has general agency authority to bind the LLC. Soon
thereafter, local fruit supplier, approaches member Q, and con-
tracts with Q in the name of the LLC to deliver $10,000 worth of
fruit to Mom and Pop's Grocery, LLC. Upon delivery, Mom and
Pop, LLC, refuses to accept and pay for the fruit. Local fruit sup-
plier sustains losses of $10,000 and sues Mom and Pop, LLC.
Who will prevail?
Q clearly had no actual authority to purchase the fruit from
the fruit supplier nor does the statute grant him apparent au-
thority covering the LLC's entire business. Q's ability to bind the
LLC depends on whether Q's apparent authority, created by Q's
actual authority under the operating agreement, to deal with the
butcher, fishery market, and distributor, is broad enough to
encompass transactions with the fruit supplier. Under these
facts and circumstances, Q should be considered a general agent,
tantamount to a manager, and thus able to bind the LLC with
the fruit supplier. Q has received extensive actual authority to
bind the LLC on a continuing basis with other highly visible
third parties, such as the butcher, the fisherman, and the dis-
tributor, who are similar to the fruit supplier. Moreover, despite
the formal designation of managers, this LLC on a practical
level operates more as a decentralized business, similar to a
not be very helpful because limited partners will not often participate in the busi-
ness enough to be deemed general agents due to the fear of being held personally
liable as general partners. See supra note 42.
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closely-held corporation, general partnership, or member-man-
aged LLC. Consequently, the fruit supplier in this situation
would reasonably conclude that Q has general agency status
covering the LLC's business. If Q's apparent authority were
interpreted more narrowly under the special agency principles,
Q's contract with the fruit supplier would likely be outside this
level of apparent authority, creating an intolerable burden for
third parties to determine the details of the operating agree-
ment.6
The second hypothetical presents a management model on
the other side of the spectrum when compared to the first hypo-
thetical. This hypothetical involves a more widely-held, man-
ager-managed LLC operating as a highly centralized unit, where
the operating agreement grants a nonmanaging member very
limited actual authority to perform a specific task.
The fifty members of John Doe's Cattle farm, LLC, properly
appoint A and B, each of whom own only one percent of the LLC's
profits, losses, and capital, as managers of the LLC. The written
operating agreement properly grants member F actual authority
to purchase 100 head of cattle at $300 per head from cattle seller
G and H. It takes member F four months to complete the task
and during this period F is not otherwise an employee of the LLC
nor has any other involvement in the LLC's business. The manag-
ers handle all aspects of the LLC's business. Over the four
months, while observing the activities of F and the LLC, feed
seller I concludes F has agency authority to bind the LLC. Soon
thereafter, seller I approaches member F and contracts with F to
buy $4,000 worth of feed for John Doe's Cattle Farm, LLC. Upon
delivery, John Doe's Cattle Farm, LLC, refuses to accept and pay
for the feed. Feed seller I sustains losses of $4,000 and sues the
LLC. Who will prevail?
F clearly had no authority to purchase the feed from I nor
did she possess apparent authority under the statute covering
the LLC's business. Fs ability to bind the LLC depends on
whether the limited task of purchasing 100 head of cattle con-
64. See 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, ONEAL'S CLOSE CORPORA-
TIONS § 8.04, at 21 (3d ed. 1994) (noting that some courts interpret the apparent
authority of corporate officers more broadly with closely-held as opposed to public
corporations because the closely-held corporate setting involves a business operated
more informally with the same persons serving in multiple capacities).
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fers general or special agency status with respect to the LLC's
business. Member F should be considered a special agent, hav-
ing no apparent authority to bind the LLC with I, because the
contract to buy feed from I extends well beyond the specific task
of purchasing the cattle.' The actual authority granted to F
more properly fits that of a special agent, a narrowly defined
task with no continuity of service.' Moreover, because the LLC
operates as a highly centralized unit, the managers A and B
clearly represent the only persons who can be viewed as general
agents with broad apparent authority to bind the LLC in the
scope of its usual business. Although treating F as a special
agent may seem harsh to third parties in !s situation, strong
arguments support forcing the third parties to absorb the loss in
this situation. If the LLC's management operates in a highly
centralized manner, essentially similar to a limited partnership
or a traditional corporation, third parties should have the affir-
mative duty to ascertain who the managers are and the extent
of the actual authority granted to any persons not part of the
management group.'
Although these hypotheticals provide useful guidelines on
opposite ends of the spectrum for determining special or general
agency status when a nonmanaging member receives actual
authority, many situations will arise in between the relatively
straightforward closely-held, decentralized LLC granting exten-
sive authority and the widely-held, highly centralized LLC
granting limited authority. For example, in hypothetical two, if
the LLC were closely-held, arguably at least, some third parties
dealing with F should be protected under general agency princi-
ples, not because of the degree of F's actual authority, which
remains limited, but because of the closely-held, decentralized
management style in which the LLC operates.' Moreover, in
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 161A cmt. b (1958).
66. See id.
67. See PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 301 (1992) (clarifying in commentary
that, once the articles of organization specify that the LLC is manager-managed,
third parties have the burden to determine who the managers are); see also 1
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 3, § 8.09 (advising third parties to ascertain first
if the LLC is manager-managed, and if so, who the managers are and, finally,
whether any nonmanaging members attempting to deal with the third party possess
actual authority to bind the LLC in the specific transaction).
68. Because of the limited duration of Fs task, agency law alone will never
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the closely-held, decentralized setting, as the number of or dura-
tion of Fs tasks increase, the argument for treating F as a gen-
eral agent grows stronger.69 On the other hand, if the LLC in
hypothetical one has widely-held owners and operates using a
centralized management structure, the fruit supplier may have a
weaker argument for treating Q as a general agent because the
widely-held, centralized nature of the LLC should alert third
parties that the member's authority may have boundaries. The
fruit supplier's argument grows even weaker as Q's tasks or
their duration diminish.
When the Alabama Legislature refines the Alabama LLC
Act, the commentary accompanying the management and agency
provisions should extensively discuss the special or general
agency status of nonmanaging members acquiring actual author-
ity to bind a manager-managed LLC. In most cases, whether or
not a particular member crosses over from special to general
agency status will be a facts-and-circumstances determination to
be decided by courts on a case-by-case basis. However, the com-
mentary can provide guidance to LLC users, hopefully cutting
down the need to use the courts when disputes arise.
The comments should identify the two independent factors
bearing on special and general agency status: (1) the factors
provided by agency law which in summary identify the degree of
actual authority granted and (2) whether the LLC's level of
ownership is widely-held with a centralized management struc-
ture or closely-held with most or all of the members participat-
ing at least to a limited degree. The commentary could use ex-
amples similar to hypotheticals one and two illustrating the
opposite sides of the spectrum.70 The commentary should indi-
cate that members of a closely-held LLC operating in a decen-
cause F to become a general agent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 3(2).
Consequently, only the characteristics of the business itself (as closely-held with
participants performing multiple roles) would justify labeling F as a general agent.
69. The degree of authority assumed, albeit still very limited, at some point
should cause nonmanaging members of closely-held LLCs to become general agents
even though agency law alone would still deem them special agents. The LLC's
similarity to a general partnership or closely-held corporation with shareholders
performing multiple roles justifies imposing general agency status on all owners
involved in the business solely because of the nature of the business. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 161(A) & commentary (1958).
70. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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tralized management style more easily become general agents,
even if the degree of actual authority would otherwise confer
only special agent status under pure agency law. In other words,
it should require less tasks both in number and duration to
transform a member out of special agency status if the LLC
operates as a closely-held unit similar to a general partnership
or closely-held corporation. On the other hand, members of more
widely-held LLCs operating in a centralized management struc-
ture should have the ability to take on more tasks without los-
ing their special agency status. Consideration of the LLC's man-
agement operation when determining a nonmanaging member's
special or general agency status helps fairly balance the need to
protect third parties from the unauthorized acts of members
while allowing the other members of the LLC to avoid the conse-
quences of unauthorized contracts that third parties should have
reasonably avoided.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTY PROVISIONS
The fiduciary duties imposed by law on participants in busi-
ness organizations are needed to ensure that those with power
do not take advantage of others.71 Some commentaries have
suggested that the fiduciary duties owed in business organiza-
tions, corporations and partnerships being the most common,
originated in the context of trusts, where the settlor and benefi-
ciary are clearly dependent on the trustee to act in their best
interests. 2 A fundamental, early interpretation of fiduciary
duties owed in the context of a business relationship extending
beyond a mere contract identifies the extent of the participants'
dependency on each other as a critical factor in defining the
scope and strength of the fiduciary duties owed.73 Because the
relationships in many business organizations will be more com-
plex than a simple trust, it may be difficult to clearly determine
which participants are fiduciaries, to whom they owe fiduciary
71. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL & LEWIS D. SOLOMON, CORPORATE FINANCE AND
GOVERNANCE (1992).
72. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of
Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1407-08 & n.15 (1985).
73. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.).
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duties, and the actual obligations owed.74
Based on the assumption that the partners have joined
together and pooled all or most of their economic efforts toward
making a profit, RUPA's duty of loyalty continues UPA's re-
quirement that partners account for any profits of the partner-
ship and refrain from usurping any profit properly belonging to
the partnership.75 Presumably, in response to the increased
complexity of partnership business relationships, RUPA further
states that a partner's pursuit of self-interest does not per se
indicate a violation of a duty or obligation.76 Moreover, RUPA's
fiduciary duties are not exclusive because the language allows
the partners considerable leeway to alter the fiduciary duties in
the operating agreement.77 Unlike UPA, RUPA also establishes
an explicit duty of care to refrain from acting in a manner that
constitutes gross negligence or willful misconduct.78 The draft-
ers presumably created a statutory, gross negligence-based duty
of care because the partners on a practical level do not possess
total ability to control each other.79
As noted, the Alabama LLC statute contains no provisions
expressly addressing the fiduciary duties owed by members and
managers.' Using the language from RUPA, the Uniform LLC
Act imposes on all members of a member-managed LLC and all
managers of a manager-managed LLC duties of loyalty and care
based on partnership principles.81 Nonmanaging members of a
74. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel A. Fischel, Corporate Control Transac-
tions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 700-03 (1982).
75. See RUPA § 404(b) cmt. 2 (1994).
76. See i&L § 404(e).
77. See id. §§ 404(a), 404(e), 103(bX3)-(4). Contractual limitations of the duties
of loyalty and care will be upheld as long as the agreement is not manifestly
unreasonable. This statutorily sanctioned ability to severely limit fiduciary duties
represents a major change from UPA.
78. See id. § 404(c) & cmt. 3.
79. See id. Although UPA recognized no statutory duty of care, some courts im-
plied a gross negligence-based duty of care, see Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d
348, 352 (Me. 1988), while others read the statute literally finding no duty of care
at all between the partners, see Ferguson v. Williams, 670 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984).
80. But see BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 3, § 10.01[2][a] (suggesting that
ALA. CODE § 10-12-19, which allows members to deal as third parties with the LLC,
functions as a quasi duty of loyalty which does not restrict self-dealing or competi-
tion with the LLC).
81. See ULLCA § 409 (1995).
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manager-managed LLC generally owe no fiduciary duties at
all.82 If the member takes on responsibilities of the LLC's busi-
ness normally held by the manager, or if the manager relin-
quishes its managerial responsibilities, the Uniform LLC Act
contains general statutory language imposing fiduciary duties
commensurate with the member's responsibilities and removing
fiduciary duties to reflect the manager's decreased responsibili-
ties.' In order to maintain a competitive statute, the revised
Alabama LLC statute must adopt express fiduciary duty provi-
sions. Moreover, the vast flexibility allowed by the operating
agreement to vary the basic structures of both member-managed
and manager-managed LLCs makes extensive commentary im-
perative in order to help define fiduciary duties that need to
vary from these default provisions.'
A Member-Managed LLCs
By statutorily conferring management rights to all mem-
bers, the member-managed LLC presumes that the members
have joined together to pool their economic resources and make
a profit as would occur in a general partnership. Following the
spirit of the Uniform LLC Act, Alabama's revised LLC Act
should use the language of Alabama's RUPA and impose the
same fiduciary duties of loyalty and care that general partners
owe each other.' LLC members, like general partners, need a
82. See id. § 409(hX1).
83. See id. § 409(hX3)-(4); see also Dickerson, supra note 3, at 458 (labeling the
Uniform LLC Act's statutory alternation of fiduciary duties when members take on
more or managers take on less responsibility as a "sliding scale for the standards of
performance").
84. Commentators recognize that fiduciary duties owed in many LLCs cannot be
simply defined by pure references to either partnership or corporate law. See gener-
ally DeMott, supra note 3, at 1043-45; Dickerson, supra note 3, at 417-20; Bahls,
supra note 3, at 45-46; Miller, supra note 3, at 28-30; Curwin, supra note 3, at 989-
91.
85. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 3, §§ 10.03[1][a][i] (nine states
contain statutory language imposing a partnership duty of loyalty on LLC members
and managers), 10.02[1][b] (four states contain statutory language imposing a gross
negligence based duty of care on LLC members and managers), 10.02[1][a] (eight
states contain statutory language using the revised model business corporation act to
craft the duty of care owed by LLC members and managers); see also Bahls, supra
note 3, at 80-81 (recognizing that the fiduciary duties imposed by partnership rules
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strong duty of loyalty because the members are likely devoting a
substantial amount of time and resources to that one busi-
ness.' Similarly, because LLC members possess the same abili-
ty to monitor each other's performance as general partners they
should enjoy the same gross negligence-based duty of care.
Moreover, members of LLCs in business ventures that do not
require these partnership-based fiduciary duties will have the
flexibility to alter and, if necessary, weaken the fiduciary duties
in the operating agreement."
The limited liability protection LLC members enjoy should
not affect the fiduciary duties the members owe each other de-
spite the fact that general partners are personally liable for all
debts of the partnership. The policy behind the necessity of fidu-
ciary duties has nothing to do with the presence or absence of
limited liability. Rather the need for and the scope of fiduciary
duties looks to the degree of trust, dependency, and imbalance of
power between the parties.' In the context of business organi-
zations, the extent the participants possess the power to and
actually participate in the business helps determine the trust,
dependency, and power imbalances between the parties. Part-
nerships and close corporations impose strong fiduciary duties
between the partners and shareholders because the closely-held
nature of the business, and the high degree of participation and
investment in the enterprise by each individual indicates a high
level of trust and dependency among the parties with the poten-
tial for abuse of power.' Because members of a member-man-
aged LLC essentially act like general partners or close corpora-
tion shareholders, the default fiduciary duties should reflect
partnership law.'m
are better suited to the informed management typical of LLCs than are the complex
corporate rules).
86. See generally PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. ACT § 401 commentary (Report of Nov.
19, 1992) (recognizing that "because LLC interests are not freely transferable, mem-
bers who are dissatisfied with their investments must resort to active involvement
rather than simply exiting the firm").
87. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
88. See generally supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
89. See generally Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512-15
(Mass. 1975); Henricksen v. Big League Game Co., No. CO-95-388, 1995 WL 550935,
at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 1995); PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 402 com-
mentary at 26-28.
90. See Bahls, supra note 3, at 80-81; see generally PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co.
19961 163
Alabama Law Review
Ascertaining a particular member's fiduciary duties becomes
more complicated if the operating agreement vests the ability to
manage and bind the LLC in less than all the members. Ques-
tions arise concerning the duties of loyalty and care owed be-
tween the members with more business responsibilities and
those members with less or no business responsibilities. Because
partners in general partnerships often use the partnership
agreement to create management committees,91 partnership
law addresses the fiduciary duties owed when partners in fact
exercise either more or less control than contemplated by the
statute. Partners vested with greater responsibility to manage
and control the partnership owe heightened fiduciary duties
because they are depended on by and enjoy more power over the
other partners not part of the management committee.92 Conse-
quently, the Alabama Legislature need not add any special stat-
utory provisions to deal with fiduciary duties when member-
managed LLCs adopt management committees. The commentary
should incorporate by analogy the partnership law precedents
addressing these situations.93
B. Manager-Managed LLCs
As noted, manager-managed LLCs vest statutory authority
to manage and control the LLC in the managers, essentially like
general partners in a limited partnership. General partners of a
limited partnership owe the same fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care that partners in a general partnership owe each other while
limited partners owe no fiduciary duties by virtue of their status
as limited partners.' Limited partnership law assumes that
ACT §§ 401-402 & commentary at 26-30.
91. See 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 19, § 6.03(b).
92. See Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat Bank, 348 F. Supp. 61, 99 (N.D. Ala.
1968); Burgess Mining & Constr. Corp. v. Lees, 440 So. 2d 321, 334 (Ala. 1983); 68
C.J.S. Partnership § 76 (1950); see also Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y.
1928). The partners not on the management committee should still owe the same
fiduciary duties unless the facts strongly suggest that they enjoy no participation in
or control over the business. See 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 19, § 6.03(b).
93. See Dickerson, supra note 3, at 442-43 (suggesting that members of a
member-managed LLC with a management committee are similar to general part-
ners or shareholders in a closely-held corporation).
94. See RULPA §§ 303, 403, 1105 (1985).
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the partnership and the limited partners trust and depend on
the general partners, who possess exclusive power over the busi-
ness.95 Following the spirit of the Uniform LLC Act which im-
poses fiduciary duties consistent with the limited partnership
approach, Alabama's revised LLC Act should use the language of
the Alabama RUPA and impose on the managers the same fidu-
ciary duties of loyalty and care that general partners owe.
Nonmanaging members of manager-managed LLCs, generally
trust and depend on the managers similar to the manner limited
partners trust and depend on the general partners. 6
Nonmanaging members, who are tantamount to limited part-
ners, should owe no fiduciary duties at all except a limited duty
of loyalty to avoid taking LLC business opportunities the mem-
ber has learned about by having access to confidential informa-
tion.97
In the corporate context, directors owe a weaker duty of
loyalty embodied in the corporate opportunity doctrine because
the law assumes that directors, who individually possess no
statutory power to bind the corporation, participate in more
business activities than simply serving that one corporation.98
The corporate duty of care, an elaborate set of legal doctrines
revolving around the conflict of interest provisions and the busi-
ness judgement rule, balances the needs of directors to make
business decisions without fear of being second guessed and of
shareholders to challenge poor performance."
Because LLC managers more closely resemble general part-
ners, the default fiduciary duty provisions applied to managers
should be partnership rather than corporate based. Unlike gen-
eral partners, corporate directors have no ability to bind the
corporation with third parties."° The policy oriented role of
corporate directors removes them from the day-to-day running of
the business justifying the weaker duty of loyalty and the more
complex standards embodied in the duty of care.'0 ' Even direc-
95. See 4 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 19, § 14.04(a)-(b).
96. See PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §§ 401-402 & commentary at 26-30.
97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 387 cmt. b (1957).
98. See Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897, 901 (2d Cir. 1967); see also COx, supra
note 32, §§ 10.11, .13, .15.
99. See Cox, supra note 32, § 10.2.
100. See id. §§ 8.3, 9.10.
101. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.2 (1986); Cox, supra note 32,
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tors, who also serve as officers thus possessing the ability to
bind the corporation, 2 cannot be completely analogized to
general partners because their management powers come from
the corporation's by-laws, a resolution of the Board, or their
status as employees rather than from corporate law."°
Like general partners, LLC managers receive the combined
power to make major policy decisions and run the day-to-day
aspects of and bind the business directly from the statute.'0
4
The statutory management structure of a limited partnership
and manager-managed LLC assumes that the limited partners
and members place a higher level of trust in the general partner
or manager thus justifying imposing the stronger duty of loyal-
ty. 5 When analyzing the duty of care, limited partners, mem-
bers, and shareholders of traditional corporations probably
equally depend on their respective fiduciaries to competently run
the business. However, it nevertheless seems more reasonable to
use the partnership legal precedents to define the duty of care
owed by managers because legally they more closely resemble
general partners."°
Although the refined Alabama LLC statute should establish
partnership based fiduciary boundaries aimed at the simplest
manager-managed LLCs, the commentary should clearly state
and extensively discuss with examples, situations where it
would not be appropriate to apply the literal statutory provisions
discussed above. Because the operating agreement allows unlim-
ited flexibility to restrict the manager's management powers or
§§ 9.1, .2.
102. See CLARK, supra note 101, § 3.3; Cox, supra note 32, § 8.2.
103. See COX, supra note 32, §§ 8.2, .7.
104. See supra notes 35, 36, and 38.
105. See PRoToTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §§ 401-402 & commentary (Report of
Nov. 19, 1992).
106. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text. The core substance defining
the duty of care owed by corporate and partnership fiduciaries uses the same
standard, gross negligence. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985)
(stating that directors must act grossly negligent in order for their actions to be
beyond the business judgement protection thus resulting in a breach of the duty of
care). Although both corporate and partnership duty of care tests focus on gross
negligence, vast procedural differences exist. The partnership standard more directly
tests the conduct for gross negligence. See RUPA § 404(c) and cmt. 3. The corporate
standard contains a vast layer of analysis applying conflict of interest provisions and
the business judgment rule presumption. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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enhance the members' powers, the basic boundaries outlined
above will not always fit when interpreting the appropriate
fiduciary duties owed by managers and members in a manager-
managed LLC.0 7 Moreover, the precedent applicable to limited
partnerships will be of little use because legal and practical
constraints prevent limited partners from assuming and general
partners from relinquishing control over the partnership's busi-
ness.' When the Alabama Legislature revises the LLC Act, the
statute should only acknowledge that the general fiduciary du-
ties may vary if the operating agreement allows nonmanaging
members the ability to participate in the business or takes away
some of the manager's statutory powers. Only the commentary
can more specifically define the possible variations in the fidu-
ciary duties and ultimately the courts will have to establish the
standards of fiduciary duties owed in many of the hard cas-
es. 109
For example, hypothetical one involves a manager-managed
LLC where a nonmanaging member should clearly owe far
greater fiduciary duties than the almost nonexistent duties im-
posed by the simple manager-managed LLC." ° Under the
facts, member Q of a five-member, closely-held LLC, consisting
of managers X and Y and two other members, receives actual
authority through the operating agreement to perform a number
of important, ongoing business transactions."' The commen-
tary should clearly indicate that, because Q serves as a general
agent for the LLC, Q owes the same fiduciary duties as a for-
mally appointed manager. The combination of Q's extensive
business activities and the closely-held, informal nature of the
LLC, despite the formal presence of managers, justifies extend-
ing the fiduciary duties to cover the whole business rather than
being confined to the specific tasks, consistent with special agen-
107. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (stating limited partners are
unable to control the business because of possible personal liability exposure and
general partner is unable to relinquish power because as a practical consideration,
limited partners are unavailable to assume the responsibility); see also 4 BROMBERG
& RIBSTEIN, supra note 19, §§ 14.01(a)-(c), .02(a)-(c).
109. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
110. See Dickerson, supra note 3, at 457 (commentator states that greater control
over the business requires greater fiduciary duties).
111. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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cy law. Because Q performs significant, ongoing business trans-
actions for a closely-held, informal LLC that resembles a general
partnership or closely-held corporation,"2 the members proba-
bly trust and depend on Q more than special agency law would
recognize. Furthermore, Q, as a practical matter, from the per-
spective of the other LLC members depending on him, possesses
power more like a general than a special agent.
The commentary cannot precisely define the level of fiducia-
ry duties owed by a nonmanaging member assuming business
responsibilities in all cases. For example, in hypothetical one the
extent of Q's fiduciary duties will be much harder to define if Q
only has authority to conduct ongoing business transactions with
the distributor. Arguably, the more limited nature of Q's author-
ity, justifies using special agency law to limit the fiduciary du-
ties owed by Q to only cover the transactions with the distribu-
tor rather than covering the whole business. Because Q pos-
sesses far less power to bind or otherwise control the business it
seems reasonable to assume the other members do not trust and
depend on him to the heightened degree of a general agent. On
the other hand one can argue that the strong resemblance of
this LLC to a general partnership or closely-held corporation
justifies treating Q as a general agent for the whole business
despite his more limited authority because in closely-held busi-
nesses the participants trust and depend on each other more
intensely."' Ultimately, courts will have to decide the level of
fiduciary duties owed in these borderline cases."4 The com-
mentary should clearly state that nonmanaging members of
closely-held, manager-managed LLCs more easily acquire the
fiduciary duties of a general agent than nonmanaging members
performing comparable duties for widely-held LLCs using a
centralized management structure. Because on a practical level
closely-held LLCs are functioning like general partnerships or
closely-held corporations,"5 the remaining members will base a
112. See 1 ONEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 64, §§ 1.05, .08 (explaining that
closely held corporations tend to operate like partnerships using the corporate form
solely to achieve limited liability); supra note 89.
113. See Bahis, supra note 3, at 67.
114. See id. (urging courts to refrain from adopting partnership or corporate
fiduciary duties in all cases and to maintain flexibility on a case-by-case basis).
115. See id. at 49.
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higher level of trust and dependency on the performance of few-
er transactions by the nonmanaging members.
The commentary should also address the fiduciary duties
owed by the managers if nonmanaging members assume respon-
sibilities over the business. In hypothetical one, arguably, the
nature of the responsibilities assumed by managers X and Y
justifies leaving the full fiduciary duties of loyalty and care cov-
ering the entire business in place. The facts of hypothetical one
strongly suggest that X and Y have not abrogated their general
business responsibilities and, therefore, have the ability to moni-
tor Q's performance and the power to remove Q if Q proves to be
incompetent."6 Consequently, under these facts the members
of the LLC probably still totally trust and depend on X and Y to
maintain the entire business.
However, as X and Y's level of responsibility and power
decreases, at some point it will not seem fair to hold them to full
fiduciary duties covering the scope of the entire business solely
because of their token status as managers. Unlike third party
creditors, who rely on the articles identifying the managers for
purposes ascertaining the existence of authority to bind the
LLC, members of the LLC should be fully aware of a manager's
extremely limited role in conducting the LLC's business. Once
the manager's role diminishes below a certain level, it no longer
seems reasonable for the members to trust and depend on that
manager to maintain the entire business. For example, if X and
Y have been relegated to the role of mere ministerial agents, like
filing tax returns and keeping books, it seems more appropriate
to center the fiduciary duties around those activities under spe-
cial agency law. Nevertheless, to the extent X and Y play a larg-
er role than that of mere ministerial agents, their ability to
avoid manager-based fiduciary duties should still be very diffi-
cult even if they assume less responsibility over the business
than suggested by the facts of hypothetical one. Because X and
Y have agreed to be managers, placing themselves in the fiducia-
ry position over the business, the commentary should state that
X and Y must carry a heavy burden of proof that it is no longer
reasonable for the other members to trust and depend on them
to maintain the entire business because they have relinquished
116. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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significant responsibilities over the most important aspects of
the business and in fact have no practical control over those
transactions.
Hypothetical two also provides a useful starting point when
exploring how the commentary should alter the fiduciary duties
owed by the members and managers when widely-held LLCs
change the statutory management structure. In hypothetical
two, member F, who takes on limited authority to conduct one
transaction, should owe duties of loyalty and care covering that
one transaction only under the laws governing special agen-
cy. 117 The law of special agency will properly confine Fs duty
of care to the purchase of the cattle and will leave F free to
pursue business activities unrelated to this one transaction
without regard to the duty of loyalty. The limited nature of F's
involvement combined with the widely-held structure of the LLC
makes special agency principals the most appropriate standard
to define the scope ofFs fiduciary duties.
As member F assumes more of a role in the LLC's business,
it becomes more difficult to define Fs fiduciary duties. At some
point, if F assumes significant business responsibilities on an
ongoing basis, F will be treated as a general agent of the LLC's
business for purposes of ascertaining the degree of F's apparent
authority to bind the LLC with third parties. However, as previ-
ously discussed, F should be able to assume a fair degree of au-
thority and responsibility without crossing over from special to
general agency status due to the widely-held and centralized
management structure of the LLC.
When ascertaining the degree of Fs fiduciary duties, the
commentary should consider both the degree of F's responsibili-
ties and the widely-held and centralized management structure
of the LLC. Because this LLC has many members and a formal
centralized management structure, it is not reasonable for the
other members or managers A and B to depend and trust F to
maintain the entire business unless F takes on a substantial
level of responsibility rendering her indistinguishable from man-
agers A and B. Consequently, it should be extremely difficult for
nonmanaging members like F in hypothetical two to cross over
from special to general agency status for fiduciary duty purpos-
117. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
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es. The commentary should state that nonmanaging members of
LLCs similar in structure to hypothetical two can assume sub-
stantially more business responsibilities than comparable mem-
bers of LLCs like hypothetical one and still have their fiduciary
duties confined to the responsibilities assumed rather than cov-
ering the whole business.11
If the LLC in hypothetical two uses the operating agreement
to adopt a business structure more closely resembling a tradi-
tional corporation, arguably it becomes unfair to impose the
more stringent partnership based duty of loyalty on the manag-
ers. If the managers use the operating agreement or employ-
ment contracts to shift the bulk of the day-to-day management
decisions and transactions to members or others that essentially
function as corporate officers, the managers now more closely
resemble a corporate board and probably are involved in a num-
ber of other business activities. The commentary should state
that this situation may justify using the weaker corporate oppor-
tunity doctrine to define the managers' duty of loyalty. More-
over, if the LLC truly operates as a traditional corporation with
the three-layered separation of ownership and control, it may be
appropriate to grant the protection of the business judgment
rule to the managers when applying the duty of care." 9
IV. CONCLUSION
When the legislature re-examines Alabama's LLC Act, the
refinement to the actual statutory provisions addressing the
LLC's management need only make conforming changes to re-
flect Alabama's adoption of RUPA. With manager-managed
LLCs where the operating agreement vests actual authority to a
nonmanaging member to perform specified business activities,
the commentary should be expanded to help practitioners and
118. The managers of the LLC in hypothetical two should still owe the same fi-
duciary duties of loyalty and care even if F takes on significant responsibilities.
Because this LLC is widely held, the other members probably have little or no
knowledge of Fs responsibilities, and therefore, will continue to depend on the
managers to maintain the entire business. But see ULLCA § 404(h) (1995). The Uni-
form LLC Act's statutory removal of manager's fiduciary duties makes no reference
to the closely-held or widely-held nature of the LLC.
119. See supra note 106.
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the courts determine the scope of the nonmanaging member's
apparent authority to bind the LLC.
The list of determinative factors identified in the commen-
tary should include the extent of authority granted to this mem-
ber, a criterion which encompasses a number of considerations
used in agency law to distinguish special and general agents.
The member's assumption of fewer responsibilities with a lim-
ited duration suggests a special agency relationship with the
LLC conferring a limited scope of apparent authority only ex-
tending to the specific responsibilities performed by the
nonmanaging member. On the other hand, as responsibilities
increase and the duration becomes continuous, at some point the
member crosses over to general agency status and acquires
broad apparent authority covering the scope of the LLC's busi-
ness.
The commentary should further identify the LLC's actual
management structure as a separate factor to determine wheth-
er the nonmanaging member's apparent authority covers the
whole business under general agency principals. If the LLC
operates as a closely-held business with essentially a decentral-
ized management structure in practice, third parties more easily
conclude that members possess authority to bind the LLC; there-
fore it should require fewer business responsibilities to cause a
nonmanaging member to become a general agent, tantamount to
a manager. On the other hand, if the LLC operates as a widely-
held business, with centralized management, third parties have
less basis to conclude that a particular member possesses broad
authority to bind the LLC; therefore it should take significantly
more business responsibilities to cause a nonmanaging member
to acquire general agency status with broad apparent authority
covering the scope of the LLC's business.
The revised Alabama Act's fiduciary duty provisions should
use the language in the new Alabama RUPA and impose part-
nership based duties of loyalty and care on all the members of
member-managed LLCs and all the managers of manager-man-
aged LLCs. Extensive commentary should discuss the appropri-
ate fiduciary duties owed in the manager-managed LLCs when
the operating agreement either vests power in nonmanaging
members or removes powers from the managers. Nonmanaging
members who take on responsibilities related to the LLC's busi-
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ness should clearly owe fiduciary duties related to those respon-
sibilities. At some point, however, the level of responsibility
becomes so great that the other members may reasonably trust
and depend this nonmanaging member to maintain the entire
business. In these situations, it arguably becomes reasonable to
impose fiduciary duties on the nonmanaging member covering
the entire scope of the LLC's business even though this member
has not been formally appointed as a manager.
In addition, the size and the management structure of the
LLC should also be a factor determining if the fiduciary duties
should narrowly cover only the responsibilities assumed or
broadly cover the whole business. A nonmanaging member of a
closely-held, manager-managed LLC essentially operating as a
general partnership or closely-held corporation should more
easily acquire fiduciary duties covering the whole business.
Members of closely-held LLCs where all of them participate to at
least a limited degree, will tend to trust and depend on each
other more intensely and more readily conclude that the as-
sumption of responsibilities rather than the formal management
status implies a promise to maintain the entire business. Conse-
quently, the commentary should require nonmanaging members
of closely-held, manager-managed LLCs to assume fewer busi-
ness responsibilities before imposing fiduciary duties covering
the whole business. However, the same nonmanaging member of
a widely-held, centrally-managed LLC should be able to perform
considerably more business transactions without acquiring fidu-
ciary duties covering the entire business. Members of widely-
held, centrally-managed LLCs will trust and depend on the
managers to maintain the business. It is not reasonable for them
to assume that a nonmanaging member, even one performing a
significant number of tasks, has agreed to maintain the entire
business. Consequently, the commentary should require the
nonmanaging member to possess substantial control over the
LLC before imposing fiduciary duties covering the whole
business.
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